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CONTRACTS

FINAL EXA Hl NATION

JANUARY

25, 1965

1. Shortly after commitment to a hospital for the insane and while still confined
as a patient therein A conveyed land to B taking back Bfs note and a purchase
money mortgage to secure it. Several days lat er P qualified as A's committee
(guardian) •

B changed his mind and decided he did not want the land after all.

P is now seeking specific p erformance as against B. What decree and why?
2. A leased land to B for three years, giving B an option to buy the land for
$10 , 000 lion terms to be agreed upon." During the three years land values increased rapidly. B notified A that he wished to exercise the option "on whatever terms
you wish." Is A bound to sell the land to B i f B is willing to pay cash, or t o
comply with any other reasonable terms which A could designate? Give reasons .
3. State X has enacted the tw'o following statutes: One provides, "It shall
hereafter be illegal for anyone to do business under a trade or assumed name
unless he first files a sworn statement in the of fice of the clerk of court of
the city or county wherein such business is conducted stating the nature of the
business, the true names and addresses of the person or persons conducting such
business, and the name under which the business is to be conducted." The second
statute provided that it should be unlawful for any person to engage in any business after the license taxes on said business were more than 30 days in arrears .
X did business under the name of "Ashland Construction Company." He had not
filed as required by the first of the above statutes. He was also in arrears
more than 30 days in the payment of his license taxes. 'VJhile this state of
affairs continued , X, in the name of the Ashland Construction Company, contracted
to build, and did build, a $30 , 000. residence f or D. When the building was done
D refused to pay relying on the defense of ille gality. Is this a good defense?
Give reasons.

4. In June of 1964 P IITote the D Hotel asking for reservations for the days of
August 3 to 5 inclusive. D wrote back as folloHs ~ 'l(rle are glad to reserve two
rooms as requested. These reservations will be held f or you until 4 p .m. of the
first day unless a twelve dollar room deposit is sent us in advance." Two days
before the first reservation day and before any deposit had been sent D telegraphed P, IISorry, but I"'e must cancel your reservation as must have rooms for
unexpected notables. II Is D guilty of an anticipatory repudiation of its contract? Give reasons.
5. Retailer owed irJholesaler $5 ~ 000. When l.ofnolesaler insisted on payment Retailer
said, "I cannot pay you. I simply do not have the money, but if you will accept
$2,500. in full payment I 1vill try to borrow t he money from my father-in-law . "
Wholesaler investigated and found out that Retailer was indeed in bad financial
straights. Fearing that he might lose everythi ng he agreed to accept $2 ; 500. in
full payment and the money was sent and received . vJholesaler never acknowledged
receipt of the money, nor did he give Retailer a receipt . A year later Retailer
came into some money and \fholesaler demanded payment of the balance of the old
debt. (a) Is Retailer legally bound to pay the ~) alance in the absence of any
statute on the matter? Give reasons.
(b) If Retailer after coming into his new money , had orally promised Wholesaler
that he would p~y the balance of the o~li~at~on: a~d lrJholesaler had sued on
this new promise, what result and why ~n Jur~sd~ct~ons that have adopted the
U.C.C.?

COITRACTS

- Final Examination - January, 1965

Page 2

6. A owed B $2 , 000. payable two months later.

B assigned the right to receive
this $~,OOO. to C for ~alue thirty days before the debt was due, but C neglected
to notl.fy A of the assl.gnment. T'tvo days later G, one of B t s creditors, garnished
~ts debt to B~ and A. was duly served with the garnishment papers. Knowing nothmg of the prl.or assl.gnment A answered that he "(·ms indebted to B to the extent of
$2,000. When C found out what had happened he sought a declaratory judgment
pursuant to statute to the effect that the obligation when due should be paid to
him instead of to G. Is he entitled to such a judgment? Give reasons. -

7. F never married, but he had an illegitimate son, S,in whom he showed some
interest at times. F also operated a bakery. He was an extremely hard working
man and he purchased the bakery building, and the lot on which the building was
situated. After S returned from World War II and was studying in college under
the "G.I. Bill of Rights," FI s health started to decline . During Christmas
vac·a tion F saw S and said, "If you will quit college and learn the bakery business, JIll give you the business and everything I have. II S accepted the proposition, worked as hard as his father had worked , and was making a success of everything when F died. F left no LviII and an illegitimate child is not an heir of
its father. 1fnat are sts rights, if any, as against B who was Fts brother and
heir? Give reasons.

8. The X Corporation was chartered for the sole purpose of conducting a cold
storage warehouse business. It paid A j an architect, $5,000. for plans, and contracted in writing to buy Blackacre from B for a site for a proposed warehouse.
Before the contract for the building of the warehouse was entered into, and
before it had actually paid anything for Blacl<:acre, the land was zoned residential and thus became worthless for the purpose desired. The X Corporation refused
to pay for Blackacre and demanded that A repay it the $5,000. he had been paid
for plans that c·ould not be used elsewhere. \fuat, if any, are the X Corporation's
rights?
9. Under the lmv of agency, if A, an agent, purports to act for himself but is
in reality acting for an undisclosed principal, P, both A and P are liable to a
third party with 1vhom A has contracted and, conversely, P may disclose himself
and assert his rights. A made a written contract tvith T for his undisclosed
principal, P. Later A materially altered the terms of this contract by changing
"one year" to "two years" under the mistaken assumption that the fi?a~ agreement
was for two years. P is now trying to hold T to the contract as orl.gl.nally
written. Can he do so? Give reasons.

10. In July of 1964 A sold and delivered a stock of dry goods to B in return
for Bls oral promise to convey Blackacre to A on October 1, 1964. B refused to
keep his promise. "lhat remedies (plural), if any, has A? Give reasons.
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1. Th~ contracts ~f an insane person for whom no guardian has been appointed may
be av01ded by the 1nsane person if there has been any fraud overreaching or
advantage taken of the insane person. This rule is for the' benefit of th~ insane
p~rson and not for the benefit of the one who is sui juris . Hence, in our case
A s promise a~. act are ~ot vo~d, but at best voidable by him. Such promises or
acts are suff1c1ent cons1derat10n for a return promise so A is entitled to payment. P, as A's successor in interest, may foreclose the purchase money mort.crsrre
and hold B for any deficiency as per the terms of the agreement between A andoB~
~. No •. A is no~ bound to sell to B. The option to buy for $10,000 is void for
lndefin1teness S1nce the terms on which it was to be paid are important and have
been left to further agreement. An agreement to agree is not a binding agreement.
NarE: If B had not only leased the property, but had also made valuable improvements thereon, equity would have given him relief in order to prevent an unjust
forfeiture. But in the instant case there is nothing to show that B paid a
substantially higher rent or made any other change of position because of his
supposed option to buy.

3. The license statute is purely a revenue measure not meant for the general
protection of the public. But the registration statute is one for the protection
of the public who have a right to know with whom they are dealing. In this case
the "statute marks the party who is acting illegally. II Where a statute is passed
for the protection of a certain class (those dealing ivith people doing business
under an assumed name) such persons are not regarded as being in pari delicto,
but even if they were the law leaves the parties to illegal contracts where it
finds them on the theory that the best way to discourage such contracts is to leave
them without any legal protection.

4. Either of the anS'Vlers belO'tv:

No, D is not guilty of an anticipatory repudiation of a contract, because
there was no contract. pIS letter to D was an inquiry about reservations--not
an offer. D made P an offer which P may accept by sending a room deposit or claiming the room before the deadline. There was no consideration for keeping this
offer open as P ''had a free way out." Hence D 1-ras within its rights in withdrawing the offer before it was accepted; or
Yes. P made D an offer which P accepted. D promised the rooms to P and the
purpose of the laiv of contracts is to prevent people from being deprived of reasonable expectations based on consideration and agreement. Since D has engaged
the room and will be liable for it if he does not claim it there is consideration.
The part about room deposit or claiming the room by 4 p.m. is for the sole protection of the hotel in the event P fails to Shovl up. They are in the nature of
conditions subsequent putting an end to contract liability on the pa~t of t~ hotel
The expression of one is the exclusion of the other, so the only bas~s on Wh1Ch D
can cancel would be pIS failure to send room deposit or to claim the room by the
time indicated.

5. (a) In the absence of statute Retailer would be legally bound to pay the balance of the debt. There was no consideration fo!" l:lholesaler's promise to take
less than was due. Retailer was under a duty to 'Jay the whole debt and a part
payment is only doing part of what he was already bound ~o do. The claim here
was a past due liquidated claim. NarE: The above rule ~s changed by Code of
Virginia § 11-12 and by the U.C.C. (U.C.C. 2-209) an agreement modifying a contract within the'Sales Article needs no consideration to be binding. See comments
1 and 2 to the above section. The fact that no receipt was given or acknowledgement made, is immaterial.
.
.
(b) The U.C.C. modification is made for the protection of a debtor WhO.1S act1ng
in good faith for a commercially desirable purpose. If D sees fit to wa~ve the
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5. (b) continued:
rule, he may do so, just as he may waive the defanses of statute of limitations
and discharge in bankruptcy. No consideration lTould be needed for the w-laiver
since the matter waived formed no substantial inducement to the formation of the
original contract.
6. Y?S, he i~.

Acc~rding to the American rule, all other things being equal,
the flrs~ assl.gnee -vnns . over the second assignee. After the obligee assigns he
has noth1.ng more to assl.gn. There is no magic in priority of notice to the obligor. Even if priority of notice were to give prior rights all other things being
equal, they are not equal here. An assignee who buys a specific claim has a
stronger equity than a general creditor who did not specifically rely on the claim
as the purchaser thereof did.
HarE: None of the so-called "four horsemen" exceptions to prior in time, prior
in right in case of successive aSSignments apply to our question.

7. S is entitled to all of F's property. I am assuming that the facts can be
proven by clear and convincing evidence and that S can be corroborated. S' s
actions were referable to the contract, and he has so far performed that failure
to comply with the agreement would work a fraud on S for which mere money damages
would be insufficient compensation. S has changed his whole life's plan in reliance upon F's promise. Hhile a contract to will realty is within the statute of
frauds, here we have a sufficient part performance on S's part to remove F's
promise from the statute in equity.
8. The X Corporation has no rights against A. The fact that A has been paid indicates that the p arties recognized that the risk of not being able to use the
plans because of collateral matters over which A had no control was on the X
Corporation. However, the X Corporation need not purchase Blackacre. The purpose
of the contract has been completely frustrated. If equity protects the X Corporation there is no harsh forfeiture as B still mms Blackacre.

9. Yes, for two reasons. First, A had no authority to make a material ~lteration
in the contract. A change by an unauthc.rized third party no longer (if l.t ever
did) discharges a contract. Secondly, A was not acting fraudulently. No one
should lose as a result of the commission of an innocent act that caused no
damage. See R t/L,34, Illustration 4.
10. A is not entitled to specific performance because B has the defense of the
Statute of Frauds. Payment for land by A does not by itself amount to sufficient
part performance to take Bfs promise out of the Statute in equity, and for the
S~ reason A cannot sue B for damages for breach of contract. But since B
would be unjustly enriched at A's expense if he is allowed to kee~ the stock of
goods and the land A may sue B for the value of the goods.on q~a~-contractu~l
prinCiples, or A may rescind because of a failure of consl.deratl.on and get h1.S
stock of goods back.

